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Introduction 
Collective bargaining in the German metal and electrical engineering (M+E) industries 
has undergone a phase of considerable development since the 1990s. This paper 
examines these developments, putting a special focus on the changing bargaining 
agendas at both sectoral and company level and looks at the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining prior to the Great Recession of 2008-2010. The management of 
this crisis in metal manufacturing is a further topic. 
The M+E industries represent one of the main economic sectors in Germany.1 In 2008 
they accounted for about 12% of the national GDP. It is also a main pillar of the German 
export economy. According to the employers’ association Gesamtmetall M+E generated 
exports worth €561.1 billion2 in 2010. That is about 60% of the total German export 
volume (€959.5 billion). The metalworking industries employ some 3.9 million 
employees, of which only 800,000 are women. The most prominent sub-sector within 
M+E is the automotive industry with 780,000 workers. The core of the German car 
industry is marked by seven large manufacturers of which three: Volkswagen, Audi and 
most recently Porsche, belong to the same company group. The others are Daimler, 
BMW, Ford and GM Opel. Daimler, Audi, BMW and Porsche largely produce for the so-
called premium segment whereas Volkswagen, Ford and Opel are considered to be so-
called mass producers. Daimler also has a considerable production of commercial 
vehicles such as buses and lorries. Should any of the seven companies find themselves 
in serious difficulty this not only draws major political and public attention but each crisis 
in the automotive industry is of particular concern to the German metalworkers’ union – 
the trade union involved in M+E. The metal sector, in particular the car industry, is a 
major pillar of German unionism. Sectoral collective bargaining in M+E has for many 
years set benchmarks for collectively agreed standards of work.  
                                            
1 M+E as defined in this article covers the NACE sectors C 24.3 – 24.5, 25 – 30, 32 and 33. This definition follows the demarcation 
used by the trade union IG Metall, the employers’ association Gesamtmetall and the Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt für 
Statistik, destatis). 
2 Billion = 1,000 million 
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With the end of the Cold War new markets and opportunities appeared for employers 
and international competition became intensified. In the political arena economic and 
social policy shifted to neo-liberal deregulation and liberalisation (Dribbusch and 
Schulten 2008). When the short lived ‘unification boom’ ended in 1992 Germany entered 
a severe recession. Workers and unions lost bargaining power as overall unemployment 
steadily mounted to unprecedented highs. Since the mid 1990s collective bargaining in 
metalworking has undergone a sustained process of decentralisation which has found 
its expression in increasing numbers of so-called opening clauses in collective 
agreements which have allowed for deviations from the sectoral standards at company 
or plant level. This has gone along with a shift in company-level bargaining towards cost 
cutting. Threats of withdrawal of investments, relocation and off-shoring have made 
employees increasingly sensitive to employers' pressure. At company level a specific 
form of concession bargaining has developed whereby the employees’ side has 
accepted the management’s objective of cost cutting in return for the exclusion of forced 
dismissals, and limited job guarantees. In M+E both IG Metall and Gesamtmetall 
struggled to stabilise their membership levels. Just when IG Metall had started 
increasing efforts to stabilise its membership its main industries were severely 
challenged by the Great Recession. 
The main concern of the union then became seeking ways to avoid the economic break 
down of its organising territories. In the face of the crisis the ‘productivity coalitions’ 
(Windolf 1989: 3) which had characterised work place relations in much of 
manufacturing over the past decades now became alliances for survival. The period 
from late 2008 to the end of 2010 was marked by a kind of ‘crisis corporatism’. At 
company level employees and their representatives were prepared to make concessions 
as employers had an interest in maintaining their skilled work forces. Extended working 
time flexibility and large scale working-time accounts which had been implemented 
implemented in the mid 1990s were now instrumental to avoid redundancies. These 
arrangements were supported by the government with comparatively attractive short-
time working schemes. It is this combination that made ‘Germany’s job miracle’. 
Whereas the union was rather successful in securing the core workforces it could not 
prevent temporary agency workers and employees with fixed term contracts from losing 
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their jobs, thus making atypical employment even more attractive to management when 
the economy recovered in 2010. 
1. M+E: key figures and economic context 
Business turnover in all establishments with 20 and more employees in M+E was €892.7 
billion in 2010 (figure 1). Over the years the annual turnover in M+E shows two 
significant dips. The first appears in the recession of 1993 when turnover declined by 
9.3% compared to the previous year and the second more substantial one is the drop by 
more than 20% during the Great Recession in 2009. 
Figure 1: M+E industries: Annual turnover 1992 – 2010 in billion Euros 
(establishments with 20 and more employees)* 
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Source: Gesamtmetall based on Federal Statistical Office (destatis) 
Note: *Data not strictly comparable over time due to changing classifications. 1998 switch from German Classification of Economic 
Activities, edition 1993 (WZ 93) to classification 2003 (WZ 2003); 2003 switch to classification 2008 (WZ 2008). 
A similar picture can be seen when the development of orders between 1991 and 2010 
is examined (figure 2). Incoming orders peaked in 2007 only to decline substantially in 
2008 and 2009. 
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Figure 2: M+E industries*: Incoming orders 1991-2010, index values (2005 = 100) 
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Source: Gesamtmetall based on Federal Statistical Office (destatis) 
Note: *M+E industries without NACE sectors 32 and 33. 
Figure 3: M+E industries*: Incoming orders (quarterly change rates in comparison 
to previous year in %) 
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Source: Gesamtmetall based on Federal Statistical Office (destatis) 
Note: *M+E industries without NACE sectors 32 and 33. 
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If we look at the quarterly development of incoming orders we see that orders had 
already started to decline in the first quarter of 2008 (figure 3). The heavy downturn of 
the economy was then announced in the fourth quarter of 2008 year. The massive fall in 
incoming orders continues in the first two quarters of 2009 whereas the second half of 
2009 saw the economy starting to recover; a development which gained momentum in 
the course of 2010. 
There are different sources on employment in M+E. The main source for employment 
figures used by the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall and the employers’ 
association Gesamtmetall are the statistics for the production industries issued by the 
Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, destatis). 
Figure 4: M+E industries: Overall employment (in thousands) 1992 – 2010 
(establishments with 20 and more employees)* 
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Source: Gesamtmetall based on Federal Statistical Office (destatis) 
Notes: * Employment figures include self employed and working family members. 
Data not strictly comparable over time due to changing classifications. 1998 switch from German Classification of Economic 
Activities, edition 1993 (WZ 93) to classification 2003 (WZ 2003); 2003 switch to classification 2008 (WZ 2008). 
They have the advantage of delivering the most up-to-date data. The data, however, 
covers only establishments with 20 and more employees and includes all categories of 
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employees including self-employed and working family members. According to this 
definition there were 3.354 million people employed in M+E in 2010 (figure 4).  
Employment figures show a substantial decline, particularly in the first half of the 1990s. 
The regional dynamic of the decline becomes visible by looking at separate data for 
western and eastern Germany (table 1). Employment in western Germany dropped in 
the first half of the nineties and has been more or less stagnating since then. In eastern 
Germany we first see a massive drop in employment levels caused by the 
deindustrialisation and restructuring of the eastern M+E sector. Reaching the lowest 
point in 1997 employment recovered substantially the following years. Whereas annual 
employment declined by more than five percent between 2008 and 2010 in western 
Germany, there was only a modest decrease of less than two per cent visible in eastern 
Germany. 
Table 1: M+E industries: Overall employment (in thousand) 1991 – 2010 – eastern 
and western Germany (establishments with 20 and more employees)* 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1991 4,078 815 4,893
1992 3,970 428 4,398
1993 3,649 344 3,993
1994 3,382 313 3,695
1995 3,314 292 3,606
1996 3,212 274 3,486
1997 3,135 260 3,395
1998 3,209 274 3,483
1999 3,205 279 3,484
2000 3,221 291 3,512
2001 3,270 306 3,576
2002 3,194 309 3,503
2003 3,194 317 3,511
2004 3,156 322 3,478
2005 3,074 370 3,444
2006 3,063 378 3,441
2007 3,133 401 3,534
2008 3,225 426 3,651
2009 3,108 421 3,529
2010 3,035 419 3,454
Source: Gesamtmetall based on Federal Statistical Office (destatis) 
Notes: * Employment figures include self employed and working family members. 
Data not strictly comparable over time due to changing classifications. 1998 switch from German Classification of Economic 
Activities, edition 1993 (WZ 93) to classification 2003 (WZ 2003); 2003 switch to classification 2008 (WZ 2008). 
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A coverage of all establishments regardless their size and a gender split are the main 
advantages of the employment statistics issued by the Federal Employment Agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA). Their main series refer to employees liable to social 
security contributions (sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigte). They do not cover 
employees with so-called mini-jobs: those are jobs paid not more than €400 a month – 
the threshold for social security contributions. As of 31 December 2010 the BA recorded 
3,885,926 such employees in the M+E sector (table 2). 80% of employees were men. To 
these add some 284,000 mini-jobbers of which 182,000 have a mini-job as sole 
employment The single most important industry is the manufacturing of machinery 
(NACE 28) and the automotive industry (NACE 29). The latter is widely regarded as the 
core of the German export economy and will represent a special focus of the following 
study. 
Table 2: Employment M+E industries by sub sectors (as of 31 December 2010) 
NACE 
Code Sector Total Men Women
24.3 Manufacture of other products of first processing of steel 14,922 13,136 1,786
24.4 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals 72,355 61,344 11,011
24.5 Casting of metals 82,522 73,767 8,755
25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 745,922 606,062 139,860
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 406,888 284,270 122,618
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 339,557 245,596 93,961
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 951,097 801,360 149,737
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 778,641 656,315 122,326
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 135,056 115,794 19,262
32 Other manufacturing 218,657 113,312 105,345
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 140,309 117,185 23,124
Total M+E 3,885,926 3,088,141 797,785
Source: Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA); own calculation 
2. The automotive industry 
Turnover, production, incoming orders 
A key industry within M+E is the automotive industry. It remains one of the most 
important sectors in the German export economy. A recent study for the Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 
BMWi) underlined its economic importance and pointed to the interdependence with 
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other industries (Legler et al. 2009). According to data issued by the Federal Statistical 
Office, in 2010 the industry accounted for a business turnover of €317 billion which is 
about 37% of total turnover in M+E (referring to establishments with 50 and more 
employees). 
The domestic production of passenger cars steadily increased in Germany from the late 
1950s onwards. When the short-lived unification boom ended in 1992 production fell 
sharply but recovered throughout the 1990s. According to figures provided by the 
German Association of the Automotive Industry (Verband der Automobilindustrie, VDA) 
production peaked at 5.7 million cars in 2007 only to drop sharply in the crisis of 2008 – 
2009. The new registration of vehicles in Germany stagnated somewhat over the past 
decade – the peak of 3.8 million in 2009 is largely the effect of the car scrap bonus 
(figure 5). That it corresponds with a decline production can be explained by the fact that 
the car scrap bonus did not exclusively stimulate the sale of domestic cars but raised 
demand for imported cars as well. 
Figure 5: Domestic car production and registration of new vehicles 1991-2010  
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The German automotive industry is increasingly dependent on exports. About 47% of all 
cars produced in Germany were exported in 1991. In 1997 already 60% of all cars were 
exported and in 2007 exports accounted for some 75% of domestic production. This 
share dropped in 2009 to 69%, but the upswing in 2010 was again largely export-driven 
with 76% of passenger cars produced in Germany being shipped to other countries. 
62% of exports in 2010 went to other European, most notably western European 
countries.  
Given the weight of the automotive industry within M+E it comes as no surprise that the 
economic development during the crisis reflects that in the whole M+E sector. A closer 
look reveals that the substantial decline in orders in the industry had started in the 
second quarter of 2008 (figure 6). 
Figure 6: Automotive industries: Incoming orders (quarterly change rates in 
comparison to previous year in %) 
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During the crisis domestic production of passenger cars followed a similar pattern 
although with some delay (figure 7). Production was at a low in the first quarter of 2009 
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with 1.05 million units but recovered comparatively soon with a dip in the third quarter of 
2010 which can partly be explained by the expiry of the car scrap bonus. 
Figure 7: Domestic production of passenger cars by quarter, 2008.1 – 2010.4 
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Source: VDA, own calculation 
Employment in the automotive industry 
According to figures produced by VDA, some 709,000 employees worked in the industry 
in 2010. Of these, 398,000 worked in vehicle manufacturing and some 311,000 in the 
supply side of the sector (including some 29,000 in the manufacturing of trailers). The 
overall development of employment reveals a downswing in the early 1990s which has 
been followed by a continuous upswing since the second half of the nineties (figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Employment in the automotive industry (in 1,000s) 1991-2010 
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As in the case of M+E, the statistics used by VDA do not cover the whole industry but 
exclude small establishments. Therefore, the employment statistics of the Federal 
Statistical Office (BA) which follow the new NACE classification established in 2008 
differ from the overall industry figures given by VDA. According to BA, at the end of 2010 
some 779,000 employees liable to social security contributions worked in the industry. 
Women accounted for 16% of this workforce. To these add some 5,600 mini-jobbers. 
The two big sub-sectors – car manufacturing and the supply industries – are in many 
instances two worlds apart. Whereas the leading car manufacturers - despite differences 
in detail in products and production strategies - have very much in common, especially 
when it comes to industrial relations and the collectively agreed terms and conditions, 
the picture is much more diverse on the supply side of the automotive sector. Some 
suppliers - such as for example those providing textiles - are not even found in the metal 
industry and the economic situation and employment relations differ so much that 
general statements of significance for the supply sector are very difficult to make. So 
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when it comes to speaking about the automotive sector the perception and the public 
picture is shaped by car manufacturing.3 
3. The industrial relations framework 
The most characteristic feature of the industrial relations frame work in Germany is the 
'dual system of interest representation' based on trade unions and employers who are 
solely responsible for collective bargaining, and works councils as the main workplace 
employee representation bodies (cf. Thelen 1991; Müller-Jentsch and Weitbrecht 2003). 
Industrial action is only lawful within the context of collective bargaining and the sole 
privilege of unions and employers (cf. Dribbusch 2007). Political or general strikes are 
outlawed. 
At workplace level, employee representation in the private sector is governed by the 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, BetrVG) which was first introduced 
in 1952 and substantially amended in 1972 and 2001. The works council, which is 
elected every four years, is not a trade union structure as all employees have the right to 
vote and to stand as candidates. The works council has a number of information, 
consultation and co-determination rights but is not involved in collective bargaining and 
has no right to call industrial action. Works councillors are legally protected against 
dismissals. Works councils at sites belonging to the same legal corporation elect 
representatives to the company or group works councils. In M+E most members of 
works councils are members of the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall. All members 
of works councils who are members of IG Metall are considered by the union as ex 
officio trade union representatives. They are often members in the union’s bargaining 
commissions and elected as local, regional and national delegates to union 
conferences. 
A specific feature of German industrial relations is the system of co-determination at 
board level. It was first established in its most far-reaching form in 1951 in the coal, iron 
and steel industry where calls for nationalization had been most powerful. The 1976 Co-
Determination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) introduced a so-called ‘parity co-
                                            
3 The amount of more or less detailed information about car manufacturing, however, should not lead to the misperception of 
equating the situation of employees or the established pattern of industrial relations in the major car manufacturers with that of the 
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determination’ for public limited companies with more than 2,000 employees whereby 
employees’ and union representatives have the same number of seats in the 
supervisory boards as the shareholders. The latter retain, however, a decisive vote if no 
majority decision is reached. Works council and board level representation are 
intertwined as leading works councillors are usually also elected to sit on the supervisory 
board. 
The collective bargaining framework 
The legal basis of collective bargaining in Germany is laid down by the Collective 
Agreements Act, 1949 (Tarifvertragsgesetz) (Kempen and Zachert 2006). Collective 
agreements can only be concluded between employers’ associations (or individual 
employers) and trade unions. In contrast, works councils – statutory employee 
representation bodies elected at workplace and company level – may only conclude 
works agreements (Betriebsvereinbarung). Under the Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) these ‘shall not deal with remuneration and other 
conditions of employment that have been fixed, or are normally fixed, by collective 
agreement’ (Article 77, Para 3).  
According to the so-called ‘favourability principle’ (Günstigkeitsprinzip), deviations from 
collectively-agreed provisions are in principle only possible if they favour the employees 
concerned. For example, a works agreement concluded between the works council and 
management can provide for top payments or bonuses but must not undercut the 
collectively agreed rates of pay or bonus payments. However, the bargaining parties 
may agree to so-called ‘opening clauses’ in collective agreements which allow the 
bargaining parties at company level to agree on deviations from collectively agreed 
standards, even if these suspend, delay or undercut terms and conditions of the 
collective agreement in place. Depending on the wording of the agreed opening clause, 
these deviations might or might not require the final consent of the sectoral bargaining 
parties. 
Collective agreements are directly binding for all members of the bargaining parties 
concerned – that is, employees who are members of the signatory unions and all 
                                                                                                                                             
whole automotive sector in the broader sense. 
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companies who are members of the signatory employers' associations, or a single 
company in the case of a company agreement. In practice, employers bound by a 
collective agreement usually apply agreed provisions to all employees, regardless of 
whether they are trade union members or not. 
According to Article 5 of the Collective Agreements Act, the Ministry of Labour (at 
federal state level or at national level) can extend the applicability of an existing 
collective agreement to include employees and employers not bound by the agreement 
by an ‘order of extension’ (Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung, AVE) if several 
preconditions are met. Out of 73,000 collective agreements registered with the Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, BMAS) 
in 2010, only 476 were extended. None of those affected the metal working industries. 
There is no statutory minimum wage in Germany. However, collectively agreed minimum 
wages can be extended under the Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmer Entsendegesetz). 
This enables the Ministry of Labour to declare a collectively agreed minimum wage to be 
generally binding by way of a ministerial directive. Again this has had no practical 
consequence for M+E so far. 
There are two basic types of collective agreements: association-level or sectoral 
agreements (Verbands- oder Branchentarifverträge) and company agreements 
(Firmentarifverträge) for individual companies or establishments. On 31 December 
2010, there were 73,959 officially registered valid collective agreements, of which 9,477 
were pay agreements (WSI, Statistisches Taschenbuch Tarifpolitik 2011). In 2010, 
overall collective bargaining coverage of employees was 60%. The most important 
bargaining sectors are M+E, chemicals, and public services: settlements in these 
sectors often set the pattern for the overall bargaining round. There are also an 
increasing number of company agreements between trade unions and individual firms 
that are not members of an employers’ association. According to survey data, 56% of 
west German employees and 37% of employees in east Germany were covered by 
sectoral agreements in 2010 (Ellguth and Kohaut 2011). 9% of employees in west 
Germany and 17% in east Germany were covered by company level collective 
agreements. The remaining 37% of the workforce in west Germany and 51% in east 
Germany are not covered by a collective agreement. However, a significant number of 
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companies that are not formally subject to an agreement have stated that they use 
sectoral agreements as a benchmark for their own pay-setting. 
There has been a significant decline in bargaining coverage since the late 1990s, the 
period for which comparable data is available (figure 9). Today Germany has one of the 
lowest levels of bargaining coverage in Western Europe (Schulten 2010).  
Figure 9: Collective bargaining coverage 1998 - 2010 
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Bargaining parties in M+E: the union side 
The trade union landscape in Germany is dominated by the Confederation of German 
Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB), the largest trade union 
confederation in Germany which represents almost 80% of all trade union members in 
Germany. The two union confederations outside the DGB are the German Civil Service 
Association (DBB) and a small Christian Trade Union Confederation (CGB) notorious for 
undercutting terms and conditions negotiated by DGB affiliates (Dribbusch 2009). Finally 
there are a number of non-affiliated mostly professional unions. The DGB and its 
affiliated unions consider themselves to be a unitary and non-partisan movement, 
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though affiliates have traditionally had close ties and a privileged partnership with the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). 
An established role is also held by a small Christian wing with special relations to the 
Christian Democratic Party (CDU). More recently a significant number of trade unionists 
are seen to be affiliated to the new Left Party (DIE LINKE). The eight DGB-affiliates 
organise employees regardless of status, job category or profession. 
The metalworking industries are the organising territory of the German Metalworkers’ 
Union (Industriegewerkschaft Metall, IG Metall), the largest DGB affiliate with some 2.24 
million members in 2010. About 30% of the unions’ members are either unemployed or 
have retired. Almost 90% of the active membership works in the metal and electrical 
engineering industries. The most important stronghold of the union is the car industry 
where seven out of ten employees are members. In some car manufacturing plants 
union density remains at 90% and more. On the supply side of the automotive industry 
union density is a little weaker with slightly more than four out of ten employees being 
organised. Not as well organised are the electronic and IT industries where less than 
three out of ten employees hold a membership card. 
Bargaining parties in M+E: the employers’ side 
The Confederation of German Employers' Associations (Bundesvereinigung der 
Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA) is the peak organisation on the employers’ side. 
The most important single industry confederation within BDA is Gesamtmetall which 
represents the employers' associations for the metalworking industries. It is an umbrella 
organisation of a large number of regional employers’ associations in M+E. These 
regional associations are the bargaining partners of IG Metall when it comes to 
negotiate sectoral or industry-wide collective agreements. Traditionally, coverage by an 
industry-wide collective agreement comes with membership of the employers' 
association which is party to the agreement. Since the 1990s some employers’ 
associations have introduced a special membership status, known as 'Ohne Tarifvertrag' 
(OT; ‘without collective agreement’) status, which provides companies with the full range 
of services of the association but relieves them of the duty to comply with the standards 
set by the industry-wide collective agreement. Gesamtmetall was initially against this 
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type of membership but accepted it in 2005 by acknowledging associations with ‘OT’-
status as affiliates. Some companies take advantage of this special OT status but 
negotiate company-level agreements, often with the support of their employers’ 
association. Others, however, have simply refrained from collective bargaining 
altogether.4 In the eyes of IG Metall the most worrying development is the fact that 
membership in Gesamtmetall is rapidly declining and even the admission of ‘OT’-
membership has not been able to stop this decline(tables 3a and 3b). This makes it 
much more difficult for the trade union to defend existing bargaining coverage. 
Table 3a: Gesamtmetall: member companies of affiliated associations and 
employees (covered by sectoral agreements) 
Year Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 companies employees companies employees
1991 8,168 2,920,487 1,365 535,066
1992 8,081 2,738,722 1,278 270,924
1993 7,752 2,458,665 1,111 204,458
1994 7,458 2,305,423 983 163,725
1995 7,094 2,210,511 792 141,749
1996 6,731 2,109,014 655 119,713
1997 6,504 2,072,480 540 100,423
1998 6,263 2,065,300 504 90,136
1999 6,066 2,029,468 442 85,256
2000 5,826 2,038,258 426 84,214
2001 5,697 2,021,683 396 82,116
2002 5,351 1,984,010 353 77,612
2003 4,819 1,854,677 290 67,490
2004 4,508 1,801,203 266 57,823
2005 4,189 1,757,819 240 64,622
2006 3,978 1,714,027 236 65,118
2007 3,803 1,708,699 214 66,921
2008 3,685 1,703,855 212 68,318
2009 3,577 1,634,786 212 63,952
2010 3,495 1,625,796 218 64,542
Source: Gesamtmetall 
                                            
4 In the metal working industry tensions within the employers’ camp about which bargaining policy should be pursued became more 
prominent in the course of the 1996 bargaining round (cf. Thelen 2000) and some companies questioned the use of being organised 
at all. 
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Table 3b: Gesamtmetall: member companies of affiliated associations and 
employees (‘OT status) 
Year Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 companies employees companies employees
2005 1,432 164,351  
2006 1,892 223,476 7 494
2007 2,229 282,828 75 7,364
2008 2,385 320,523 84 8,775
2009 2,460 309,409 85 8,839
2010 2,639 324,634 86 10,161
Source: Gesamtmetall 
The organisation of collective bargaining in M+E 
With the notable exception of Volkswagen due to its mixed ownership, – the federal 
state of Lower Saxony holds a blocking minority of shares – not admitted to an 
employers’ association and therefore negotiates company-level agreements, the 
dominant pattern of collective bargaining is sectoral bargaining. M+E is historically 
subdivided into 21 regional bargaining areas where the appropriate employers’ 
associations negotiate with IG Metall. The most prominent bargaining areas are in the 
federal states of Baden-Wurttemberg and North-Rhine Westphalia where the bulk of the 
metalworking industries is concentrated. Sectoral bargaining usually takes the form of 
pattern bargaining whereby a pilot agreement is concluded in one bargaining region and 
then transferred - sometimes with some specific regional amendments - to the other 
bargaining areas. The sectoral collective agreements concluded cover the whole range 
of industries within M+E, i.e. the automotive industry, machine building, electrical 
industry, aerospace industry, shipyards and others. The iron- and steel industry as well 
as the metal trade are independent collective bargaining sectors. 
The decisive body on the union side is the bargaining commission (Tarifkommission). 
There are company level bargaining commissions when this form of bargaining is 
required but the most important body is the regional bargaining commission. This union 
body is composed of local union delegates representing a wide range of industries and 
sectors. These bodies decide which demands should be tabled, oversee the 
negotiations, usually conducted by a small committee, and decide about whether to 
accept or reject the outcome of negotiations. The regional bargaining commission is also 
 
 
21
responsible for declaring negotiations to be failed and to demand industrial action. The 
final decision about industrial action, however, is with the national executive of IG Metall.  
Unions and employers' associations have their own rules and procedures which govern 
industrial action. The rules of IG Metall require a ballot before official industrial action 
can be taken. The decisions to undertake a ballot and to strike are at the discretion of 
the union’s national executive committee. Short-term token strikes, so-called warning 
strikes do not require a ballot but need executive approval to be considered official. The 
national union executive also has the last word when it comes to deciding whether or not 
an agreement is to be renegotiated and is an important influence in the process of 
formulating the unions’ demands.  
Industrial action 
Post-war German strike activity can only be fully understood by appreciating the tradition 
of strike pay which is one of the classic benefits German unions provide. Strike benefits 
are paid to members involved in official strikes or locked-out by employers. The amount 
of strike pay has varied over time. IG Metall pays about 12 times the individual monthly 
contribution per week. Some unions also provide benefits in the event of warning strikes, 
others – such as IG Metall – do not. Employers' associations also provide mutual 
support and maintain funds to compensate member companies for costs arising from 
strikes and lockouts (Kittner 2005: 643–644). 
IG Metall has developed a collective bargaining policy which considers industrial action 
to be an exceptional but nevertheless necessary means to enforce demands or defend 
achievements. This policy is seen as a supplement to, rather than a contradiction of, the 
day-to-day policy of social partnership pursued the works councils. The employers' side 
in metalworking also has a tradition of sometimes seeking conflict if deemed necessary 
(Kittner 2005: 658–663). This was particularly demonstrated by the large scale use of 
lock-outs from the 1960s up to 1984 (Dribbusch 2007). Unofficial stoppages have never 
completely vanished and it has been a common albeit not frequent practice that works 
councils occasionally complacently tolerate if not encourage walk-outs via work place 
representatives to put pressure on management. These strikes which legally cannot be 
so-called by name are usually labelled as ‘information meetings’. 
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Metal manufacturing in general and the car industry in particular have emerged as 
strongholds of unionism with particular disruptive power on the part of workers because 
of the key role of the industries for the export driven ‘economic miracle’ of the 1950s and 
1960s. This went along with the establishment of a strike tradition among metalworkers 
(Kittner 2005: 378; 661) in particular in the bargaining region of Baden-Wurttemberg 
where the most prominent disputes in metal working took place. The metal sector with 
the car industry at its core dominated the official strike record for decades, not least 
because of its sheer size and the large numbers of workers who could be mobilised. 
However, compared to other European countries such as Italy, France or the UK, overall 
strike levels in Germany have always been low (cf. Shalev 1978: 15; Velden et al. 2007) 
although there is a persistent and increasing under-recording of strike activity in the 
official dispute records of the Federal Employment Agency (cf. Dribbusch, 2007, 2010). 
This has been widely regarded as a competitive advantage. Unions have always pointed 
with pride to their contribution to industrial stability. 
Social partnership and conflict 
Industrial relations in M+E and in particular in the German automotive industry are firmly 
embedded in a tradition of social partnership which emerged as a result of a post-war 
class compromise in Germany. This compromise seemed to guarantee both employers’ 
profits and benefits for workers. Nevertheless substantial differences between 
employers and unions remained. Whereas employers reclaimed absolute discretion in 
management affairs unions insisted on the expansion of co-determination rights. But 
these were not antagonistic interests as both sides shared the overall interest of 
defending the competitiveness of the German economy in the world market (Esser 
1982, 260-262). Social partnership translated into a kind of ‘competitive corporatism’ 
which also shaped the unions’ reactions to the successive economic crises.5 While 
accepting the paradigm of national competitiveness, the unions have advocated a ‘high-
road strategy’ according to which competitive advantage could best be won through 
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investments in education and training, an excellent infrastructure and a highly motivated 
and productive workforce. The latter, in particular, requires an important role for unions 
and works councils, as they are able to mediate potential conflicts at industry and 
company level. In order to characterise the ambivalent relation between institutional 
cooperation and the fundamental conflict of interest, German labour relations have also 
been described as a system of ‘conflict partnership’ (Müller-Jentsch 1999).  
Shifts in the balance of power 
Until the mid 1970s the overall balance of power was comparatively favourable for 
workers and unions. The structural power6 of labour grew as unemployment declined 
(figure 10).  
Figure 10: Unemployment rate 1950-2010 (annual averages in %) 
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Source: Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA), own calculation 
Note: Unemployment as percentage of all wage earners (abhängige zivile Erwerbspersonen) (i.e. excluding self-employed) 
                                                                                                                                             
5 The term competitive corporatism was originally introduced by Martin Rhodes (1998) to analyse the new nationally-negotiated 
social pacts, which emerged in Europe during the 1990s, and to distinguish them from traditional forms of social corporatism 
developed in the post-war period in the framework of Keynesian macroeconomic policies. In contrast to neo-liberalism with its focus 
on free market policies, the concept of competitive corporatism is grounded on the idea that institutionalised co-operation between 
capital, labour and the state is a better and more efficient way to improve competitiveness.  
6 We draw here on concepts developed by Wright (2000) and Silver (2003). 
 
 
24
The single most important factor which shifted the overall balance of power in favour of 
employers was the rise of unemployment first in the mid 1970s and then following the 
economic recession of 1992 and the deindustrialisation of eastern Germany. 
Unemployment peaked in 2005 when about 5 million persons were officially registered 
as unemployed. This was accompanied by an increasing casualisation of the workforce 
which found its main expressions in a substantial growth of fixed term contracts, 
marginal part-time jobs, temporary agency work and low pay jobs in general. Against the 
background of fewer job opportunities employees became increasingly sensitive to 
pressure from employers when faced with threats of withdrawal of investments, 
relocation and off-shoring. 
Overall union membership declined in the 1990s. Although IG Metall membership had 
peaked in 1991, following unification, this was almost immediately followed by a severe 
decline largely due to the deindustrialisation and restructuring process in eastern 
Germany and continuous job losses in western Germany (figure 11). After 2005 the 
trade union intensified initiatives to turn the tide. In conjunction with a reviving economy 
the union had just managed to slow down the decline when it was hit by the crisis of 
2010. 
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Figure 11: IG Metall membership development 1991-2010 
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The organisational strength of the union in the core of the car industry, however, could 
largely be retained although there has been a continuous shift in employment from 
manual workers to white collar engineers which poses new challenges to union 
organising. 
The institutional strength of the union at workplace level is expressed by its dominance 
of the works councils. In 2010 about 72% of all works council members within the 
organisational domain of IG Metall were members of the union, some 28% were 
unorganised and a marginal 0.3% were members of the small Christian metal workers’ 
union CGM (Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall).7 Amongst the large car manufacturers the 
share of works council members organised in IG Metall was even higher reaching 88% 
in the 2010 elections (table 4). 
                                            
7 The CGM which is affiliated to the CGB does not play any significant role in the metalworking industries. It does not negotiate 
collective agreements. Instead employers and CGM resign after the agreements negotiated by IG Metall. In 2009 the CGM claimed 
to have a total of 91,000 members across all industries. 
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Table 4: Car manufacturing: works council members, IG Metall shop stewards 
 Works council election 2010 Shop stewards 
Company members of WC of which IGM 2010 
Audi 90 77 1812 
BMW 192 171 1626 
Daimler 429 365 4897 
Ford 89 78 1576 
Opel 121 115 1184 
Porsche 54 43 196 
Volkswagen 294 279 7308 
Total 1269 1128 18599 
Source: IG Metall 
There is some consensus that important ‘pillars of social partnership’ have crumbled 
since the mid 1990s (cf. Streeck and Hassel 2003; Bispinck and Schulten 2010). 
However, despite overall tendencies towards erosion the institutional framework has 
remained relatively stable in M+E in general and in the automotive industry in particular. 
A main reason for this is that in this sector union and works councils have retained 
substantial bargaining power (Dribbusch 2011 forthcoming). However, when the 
underlying balance of power in industrial relations changed in the 1990s collective 
bargaining and the established employment relations at company level took a new 
direction and gained new content. The union agenda became widely defensive when job 
security gained priority over most other issues on the bargaining agenda both at sectoral 
and at company level. 
4. Collective bargaining since 1990: context and developments 
The 1990s was a period of profound and unprecedented change in the German system 
of collective bargaining. The end of the Cold War delivered new markets and a range of 
fresh opportunities for employers. International competition was transformed and 
intensified by the neoliberal globalization of the economy. Once the short lived 
‘unification boom’ ended in 1992, (western) Germany entered a severe recession. 
Workers and trade unions lost bargaining power as unemployment steadily mounted to 
previously unseen highs. Under the pressure of international competition and changing 
investors’ expectations, employers adopted a more aggressive approach to collective 
bargaining. Work organisation and production systems were subject to continuous 
change as companies underwent repeated waves of cost cutting and restructuring. This 
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process not only had profound consequences for employees’ working conditions but 
also changed the tasks of workplace representatives. In the political arena, economic 
and social policy shifted to neo-liberal deregulation and liberalization (Dribbusch and 
Schulten 2008) resulting in additional challenges for the work of trade unions. 
Trade union pay bargaining in the 1990s was characterised by two – markedly different 
– phases. Initially, strong economic growth allowed trade unions in West Germany8 to 
negotiate substantial real wage increases. However, the onset of economic crisis in 
1994 prompted the employers to undertake a major switch in their approach to 
bargaining – making use of the opportunity to effect a change that they long aspired to. 
From the mid-1990s, the course of bargaining was characterised by pay settlements that 
were sometimes well below inflation, the freezing and, usually time-limited, lowering of 
agreed standards, and the introduction of workplace-level ‘opening clauses’ permitting 
local deviations from collectively-agreed industry standards. The share of wages in 
national income fell to a historically low level. 
In contrast, the trade unions were able to register some successes the field of retaining 
and securing employment. The 1994 bargaining round, for example, saw a number of 
sectoral settlements in which the scope for short-term reductions in working time were 
accompanied either by full or partial corresponding pay reductions. In return, companies 
committed themselves not to implement compulsory redundancies (see below). 
In East Germany, following the agreed adoption of the basic features of the West 
German system of collective bargaining, the early-1990s was marked by a conflict over 
the pace at which agreed pay and working conditions were to converge with those 
prevailing in the West. This led to a major industrial dispute in the metalworking industry 
that culminated in an agreement on a phased process of convergence and the 
introduction of opening clauses (see below). 
Developments in East Germany led to an acceleration in the erosion of the scope and 
integrity of industry-level agreements. In practice, in the 1990s this was manifested in 
breaches of agreed provisions, company exits both from collective agreements and 
 
 
28
employer associations, and the proliferation of areas entirely outside the scope of 
collective bargaining, especially amongst small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Employer associations also found it more difficult to attract and retain firms, and ensure 
that they complied with collective agreements, and suffered increasing membership 
losses. Although sectoral agreements remained the key institution in the collective 
regulation of employment and wage standards, a gradual – but unmistakeable – process 
of transformation in the collective bargaining system was under way, most clearly 
manifested in the growing differentiation and decentralisation of collectively-agreed 
provisions and standards as well their implementation at the workplace. 
In 1999, the first red-Green coalition government composed of the Social Democratic 
Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and Alliance 90/The Greens 
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) had sought to organise a wide social consensus around 
measures to reduce unemployment and improve competitiveness through the 
establishment of an ‘Alliance for Jobs’. In the field of collective bargaining, employer 
associations sought to use this process as a means to push through moderate wage 
increases. For their part, the trade unions hoped to use the Alliance as a forum in which 
they could lay the ground for negotiated agreements on retirement at 60 and ‘phased 
early retirement’ (Altersteilzeit), in which employees entered a period of part-time work 
before retirement.9 In a compromise formulation, the national employer associations and 
trade union centre agreed on an ‘employment-focused and long-term approach to 
collective bargaining’. Although the trade unions succeeded in negotiating pay 
settlements above the rate of inflation in the years up until 2004, these were far from 
fully exhausting the cost-neutral scope of productivity growth plus price increases over 
that period. And after 2004, the overall balance of collective bargaining deteriorated still 
further. 
                                                                                                                                             
8 In this overview, ‘West Germany’ refers to those regions that made up the Federal Republic of Germany: ‘East Germany’ refers to 
regions that were part of the German Democratic Republic and which were established as constituent areas of the newly unified 
Germany from 1990.  
9 The scheme required employees to work for half their usual hours over the whole duration (up to six years). In practice, employees 
worked full-time for three years, on reduced pay, and then ceased to work, but remained in the scheme - drawing the same income 
as in the first phase. 
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Slow economic growth, which ultimately slipped into recession, served to put increasing 
pressure on the trade unions. Following the national elections in 2002, the Red-Green 
coalition adopted a radical change of course in the fields of labour market and social 
policy, crystallised in its Agenda 2010 programme. The profound differences over the 
future shape of the social security system and prospective organisation of collective 
bargaining took on the contours of a fundamental social conflict. Given a protracted 
labour market crisis and the evident failure of previous economic policy, the sources of 
the crisis were held to be the ‘structures’ and regulation of the labour market. The finger 
was directed in particular as the ‘ossified’ and ‘obsolete’ structures of the ‘collective 
bargaining cartel’. The conservative parties (CDU/CSU), the Liberals (FDP) and some 
elements of the employers called for a change in the principle enshrined in the statute 
regulating collective agreements, under which the provisions of an industry-level 
agreement could only be deviated from where this was to the advantage of employees 
(Günstigkeitsprinzip, or ‘favourability principle’). For its part, the Federal government 
announced that it would move to introduce statutory opening clauses. After many 
months of political controversy, in late-2003 the trade unions were able to fend off the 
threat of such legal intervention into the principle of free collective bargaining. 
However, the employers took advantage of this climate to push through opening clauses 
in a large number of branches, some of which were far-reaching in scope. One landmark 
development in this area was the ‘Pforzheim Accord’ concluded in the metalworking 
industry in 2004: this allowed for agreed industry standards to be departed from at 
workplace level under certain circumstances. This triggered an intensification in the 
process under which the locus of bargaining had begun to move to the workplace, 
reinforcing developments already in train since the 1990s. Workplace agreements to 
retain operations and maintain employment, together with supplementary collective 
agreements that amended industry standards, developed into a commonly-used 
instrument that weakened the scope, influence and coherence of the system of industry-
level bargaining. In many pay rounds it was the employer associations that led with their 
catalogue of demands on trade unions, the principal aim of which was to achieve an 
across-the-board lowering of agreed standards. 
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The steady erosion of the bargaining system was especially marked in the burgeoning 
low-wage sector. Pressed downward by the more stringent demands on the unemployed 
to accept a wider range of work (often below their skill level and previous pay), the 
deregulation of agency work, and the declining number of extended industry 
agreements, wages at the lower end of the income distribution began to break away. In 
response, and after a long and controversial internal debate, from 2006 member unions 
of the main trade union centre, the DGB, moved to a policy of calling for an extension of 
the Posted Workers Law to embrace additional sectors,10 the formal extension of the 
lower grades specified in collective agreements to employments not directly covered by 
collective bargaining, and an hourly statutory minimum wage of €7.50. 
However, the past decade was not only a story of stagnation or regression in the field of 
collective bargaining. In some areas, trade unions were also able to negotiate new and 
occasionally innovative collective agreements. This included the renewal of traditional 
pay structures in the metalworking industry and the public sector, together with agreed 
provisions on further training. The trade unions have also responded to changes in the 
state pension and the transition from work to retirement with collective agreements on 
occupational (company) pensions and phased early retirement. In some branches so-
called ‘demographic agreements’ have been concluded. 
Albeit with a slight lag, the financial and economic crisis has also had an impact on 
collective bargaining. Pay settlements since 2009 have dropped back markedly, and in 
many instances non-consolidated lump-sum payments have taken the place of 
permanent increases in pay scales. The 2010 pay round was most notable for 
agreements on job retention, especially in export-oriented branches such as 
metalworking, electrical engineering and electronics. 
                                            
10 In Germany, legislation implementing the Posted Workers Directive has been used as a vehicle for setting binding minimum 
wages in sectors that have been brought within the scope of the law. These pay rates are negotiated by unions and employer bodies 
in the sectors, separately to the main agreement, and put into force by a Ministerial order.  
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5. Collective bargaining in M+E 
Collective bargaining in the metalworking industry in West Germany in the 1990s was 
dominated by two issues: dealing with the consequences of the economic and 
employment crisis that began in 1992, and the – associated – conflict over the future of 
the system of industry-level bargaining. Following German unification, the main issue in 
East Germany was the transfer of Western German bargaining arrangements and the 
adjustment of the level of pay and benefits, and convergence in such areas as working 
time. During the 2000s the conflict over further steps to shift the locus of bargaining to 
the workplace level was continued. The reform of the decades-old wage and salary 
agreements through the introduction of single-status pay structures from 2002 
represented an important landmark in collective bargaining. This was joined by other 
innovations in the area of qualitative collective bargaining, such as salary conversion 
and deferral to finance company-based and other pension arrangements, training and 
development, and – in the wake of the financial crisis – workplace-based measures to 
retain jobs.  
Over the past twenty years, agreed incomes have grown markedly in real terms. The 
overview indicates that annualised increases in agreed industry pay rates in the 
metalworking industry have generally exceed price inflation – with the exception of years 
of acute economic crisis (1993-4, 2001, and 2010/2011) (table 5). Taken over the whole 
period, real agreed pay rates have risen by some 28 per cent, equivalent to an real 
increase of 1.4 per cent, with real pay growth in the 1990s running at about double the 
rate seen in the subsequent decade. 
However, when these increases in agreed pay are set against the cost-neutral scope or 
‘margin’ for distribution, which represents the sum of price increases and the aggregate 
rise in productivity, the picture changes considerably. In most years, agreed increases 
did not exhaust this scope. It should be borne in mind, however, that weekly working 
hours fell from 37 to 35 in the first half of the 1990s, with no loss of pay, which was 
equivalent to an effective increase in (hourly) pay of 5.7 per cent. This is not factored 
into the increases cited in Table 5. A detailed overview on the provisions on pay agreed 
in the bargaining rounds in M+E can be found in table A1 in the appendix. 
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Table 5: Aggregate economic development and bargaining data for the 
metalworking industry: 1990-2011 
Year  
Real 
GDP 
Consumer 
prices 
Productivity 
(per 
employee 
hour) 
‘Distributive 
scope’ 
(Col 2 + Col 
3) 
Annualised 
nominal 
agreed pay 
increases 
Real pay increases 
(Col 4- Col 2) 
Gap between 
nominal pay rises 
and distributive 
scope 
(Col 5- Col 4) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1990 5.3 2.7 3.5 6.2 5.4 2.7 -0.8 
1991 5.1 3.6 3.5 7.1 6.8 3.2 -0.3 
1992 2.2 4.1 2.5 6.6 5.1 1.0 -1.5 
1993 -0.8 3.7 1.6 5.3 3.6 -0.1 -1.7 
1994 2.7 2.8 2.9 5.7 1.9 -0.9 -3.8 
1995 1.9 1.7 2.6 4.3 5.1 3.4 0.8 
1996 1.0 1.4 2.3 3.7 2.7 1.3 -1.0 
1997 1.8 1.7 2.5 4.2 2.0 0.3 -2.2 
1998 2.0 0.9 1.2 2.1 1.8 0.9 -0.3 
1999 2.0 0.6 1.4 2.0 4.1 3.5 2.1 
2000 3.2 1.4 2.6 4.0 2.5 1.1 -1.5 
2001 1.2 1.9 1.8 3.7 1.7 -0.2 -2.0 
2002 0.0 1.5 1.5 3.0 3.6 2.1 0.6 
2003 -0.2 1.0 1.2 2.2 2.4 1.4 0.2 
2004 1.2 1.7 0.6 2.3 2.3 0.6 0.0 
2005 0.8 1.5 1.4 2.9 1.9 0.4 -1.0 
2006 3.4 1.6 3.1 4.7 2.6 1.0 -2.1 
2007 2.7 2.3 1.0 3.3 3.8 1.5 0.5 
2008 1.0 2.6 – 0.2 2.4 2.7 0.1 0.3 
2009 -4.7 0.4 – 2.2 – 1.8 3.6 3.2 5.4 
2010 3.6 1.1 1.0 2.1 0.7 -0.4 -1.4 
2011 3.5 2.4 2.7 5.1 1.6 -0.8 -3.5 
Source: Destatis, WSI-Tarifarchiv 
Overview of bargaining rounds 1991-2008 
Economic development in West Germany remained very positive in the early-1990s. 
Growth boomed, corporate profits were robust, and employment fell, if only modestly. 
The metalworking trade union IG Metall not only succeeded in negotiating substantial 
rises in agreed pay rates but also the phased move to a 35-hour week by 1995 with no 
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loss of pay. The ‘price’ of this was the conceding of a shift in the regulation of the 
organisation of working time to workplace level. Between 1991 and 1993, IG Metall was 
able to win pay increases that succeeded in largely fully exploiting the cost-neutral 
scope for distribution. In the same period, the project of reforming agreed pay structures 
in the industry was got under way. IG Metall’s proposal for collective bargaining reform 
(‘Tarifreform 2000’) envisaged the modernisation of the collective agreements that 
regulated pay grades and remuneration arrangements that had been in place since the 
1960s and 1970s. Its aim was to complete this by the mid-1990s, based on a recognition 
shared by the employers about the need for reform.11 However, the 1992/1993 
recession, which had a particularly severe impact on the metalworking industry leading 
to a sharp rise in unemployment in this sector, meant that these ambitions had to be put 
on the back burner. 
Collective bargaining then became dominated by crisis management on the issue of 
employment and efforts to resist employer demands for a lowering of agreed standards. 
In this context, the agreement at Volkswagen in autumn 1993 was of major significance 
for the rest of the metalworking sector. Faced with the prospect of up to 30,000 
redundancies, in November of that year Volkswagen and IG Metall agreed a four-day 
week (of 28.8 hours) combined with a two-year ‘no redundancy’ deal. Pay was reduced 
by 20 per cent, but regular monthly incomes were maintained by redistributing annual 
bonuses across the whole year. 
The new employer approach to collective bargaining was especially evident in the 
metalworking industry after 1994. This ranged from the open calls to lower agreed 
standards, sustained criticism of the principle of the industry agreement, a changed 
strategy on negotiations, and an aspiration to achieve a much greater degree of 
differentiation in negotiated outcomes, with various forms of compensation where 
employee concessions were made. They also threatened an ‘exodus’ of their members 
from the employer associations if their demands for massive cost reductions and further 
flexibility and scope for derogation from agreed provisions were not granted. 
                                            
11 IG Metall’s proposals embraced five areas: achieving a new and uniform system of pay determination and performance appraisal 
covering both operatives and technical/commercial employees; configuring work and technology to be sustainable in both human 
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In the end, the two sides agreed to re-instate the previous holiday provisions, which the 
employers had given notice of terminating, concluded a moderate pay rise, which was 
below inflation, and a specific agreement on employment security based on the four-day 
week principle previously agreed at Volkswagen AG. This allowed the parties at 
workplace level (that is, management and works councils) to conclude a voluntary 
workplace agreement reducing the working week to 30 hours, either with a 
corresponding cut in pay or a pay reduction that did not fully offset the cut in hours. 
1995 saw a temporary change in mood. The lowest point of the downturn seemed to 
have been passed, and there were initial signs of recovery. IG Metall took this 
opportunity to make up for the preceding years’ setbacks in the pay field. The 
subsequent dispute with the employers swiftly escalated into a 14-day strike in the 
Bavarian bargaining region, following which IG Metall was able to achieve pay increases 
that, for the first time in several years, exceeded the ‘distributive scope’, as well as 
successfully thwarting employer demands for offsetting cuts in other areas. 
In 1997, the employers were eager to make up for the 1995 setback, and in particular to 
make progress towards their aim of lowering non-wage labour costs and making annual 
agreed additional payments (holiday and Christmas bonuses) dependent on company 
performance. In addition, the employers wanted to make use of the recently-introduced 
statutory option of reducing sick pay (which is paid by employers in Germany) from 100 
per cent of previous earnings to 80 per cent. Backed by massive protests and 
spontaneous stoppages, IG Metall was able to resist this change, but was compelled to 
pay a price in the form of having to agree a cut in holiday and Christmas payments, and 
lower agreed pay increases for 1997 and 1998. 
Negotiations on the introduction of an agreed early retirement scheme, that began in 
1997, were based on similar principles to those that underlay the employment security 
agreement. The 1998 agreements on phased early retirement offset the financial 
penalties that employees were obliged to incur if they chose to retire earlier under the 
state scheme, and used this as a means of making early retirement a more attractive 
option. 
                                                                                                                                             
and environmental respects; an individual right to training; and, finally, democratisation of workplace decision-making structures 
through expanded codetermination rights for work councils and employees.  
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In the 1999 pay round, IG Metall achieved a settlement that fully exhausted the cost-
neutral distributive scope (inflation plus productivity increases) under its slogan ‘No More 
Moderation!’. The employer demand for pay increases to be linked to company 
performance, and with this a shift of effective decision making on pay to company level, 
was successfully resisted. 
The core issue in the 2000 bargaining round – alongside a pay demand – was the 
campaign for retirement at 60, which IG Metall had proposed in 1998 as a project 
intended to retain and create jobs. The employers flatly rejected the model from the 
outset and, instead, argued for flexible company-based solutions and development of 
the existing phased early retirement scheme. Although the Federal government’s initial 
response was positive, it nonetheless rejected the possibility of any form of public 
contribution. Following what proved to be difficult negotiations, the two sides agreed a 
two-stage pay increase together with a new collectively-agreed ‘employment bridge’, 
under which ‘older workers’ could enter the phased early retirement scheme for up to six 
years, with limited financial compensation for the reduction they would later incur for 
taking their state pension before normal retirement age. 
In the 2001 bargaining round, and after a series of large-scale token strikes, IG Metall in 
the Baden-Württemberg region negotiated an agreement on training that provided for an 
individual right to a regular discussion with the employer to establish the employee’s 
training needs and organise any consequent training, the costs of which were borne by 
the employer. Employees with at least three years’ service in a company had a right to 
up to three years’ unpaid leave to undertake further training and skill acquisition. The 
two sides also set up a joint body to promote further training. 
In the 2002 bargaining round, IG Metall’s main aim, alongside a general pay increase, 
was to press ahead and finalise agreement on the reform of the grading structure and 
reward system in the industry. Agreement was only reached after three months of 
negotiations, widespread token industrial action and ultimately a full ten-day stoppage. 
In addition to pay increases, the agreement also initiated the move to a new pay and 
grading structure to begin during 2005-2008. 
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The determination on the part of some employers to reject compromise in the old style 
was particularly marked in eastern Germany where unions were comparatively weak 
and bargaining coverage low. This was probably underestimated when in 2003 IG Metall 
called strikes both in the eastern German steel industry and in M+E with the aim of 
adjusting working times to the western German 35-hour week (Dribbusch 2003, Raess 
2006). In the small steel industry a compromise was agreed after 4 days, but the 
employers in the metalworking industry of Saxony were determined to defeat the union. 
11,500 union members took part in the strike ballot and 9,600 voted in favour of the 
strike (Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv 2004:18) but there were considerable problems with 
strike breakers. To make matters worse the strike was contested even within IG Metall, 
particularly when western German car manufacturers started closing down production 
due to a lack of supplies. After four weeks the strike ended without a new agreement 
being reached. It was one of the bitterest defeats in the union’s history. 
The 2004 bargaining round in western Germany which followed was not only on pay but 
on working time flexibility and an extension of opening clauses (cf. special explanations 
below). Although the trade unions were able to prevail in the political conflict over the 
issue of the principle of free collective bargaining and proposals to change the legal 
basis for the scope to deviate from industry agreements in the form of ‘opening clauses’ 
that broke out in the political arena in 2003, the employers then set about using the 
atmosphere engendered by this debate to press for a further relaxation of the industry 
agreement in the 2004 bargaining round – and registered some notable successes. 
Agreement was reached on increased scope to lengthen working hours, with an option 
for weekly hours to be extended to 40 for up to 50 per cent of the workforce in 
workplaces with a large share of highly-skilled employees. Most importantly there was 
also agreement on a general opening clause that allowed a time-limited deviation from 
agreed standards in order ‘to achieve a sustained improvement in the development of 
employment’. Concretised in the ‘Pforzheim Accord’, this provision became a landmark 
in the recent history of collective bargaining in Germany.  
The focus of the 2006 bargaining round was on pay, with the final agreement providing 
for a lump-sum payment and a subsequent rise in agreed rates with a duration of 13 
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months. There was also agreement on individual training rights based on the 
arrangements negotiated in 2001 in Baden-Württemberg. 
In the 2007 bargaining round, IG Metall demonstrated that it was still capable of 
achieving a settlement that secured pay increases in its core organising sphere 
providing for substantial real increases in pay for its members and, moreover, which ran 
counter to the employers’ core objective of negotiating an increase that was below that 
of the previous year. One major factor in this was the high degree of member 
mobilisation, expressed in the large number of token stoppages that took place once the 
agreed ‘peace clause’, that provided for a four-week ban on industrial action by either 
side following expiry of the previous pay agreement, had come to an end. However, the 
employers did succeed in introducing an additional – albeit – small step towards further 
scope for varying agreed pay through the inclusion of an opening clause covering one 
aspect of the settlement.  
The critical stages of the 2008 round in the metalworking and electrical industries were 
dominated by the onset of the financial crisis. While employee expectations and the 
formulation of the claim within IG Metall had been shaped by the preceding phase of 
robust growth, and strong corporate profitability, in the sector, preparations for 
negotiations were overshadowed by the dramatically mounting volume of bad news 
emanating from the financial markets. Although the mid-November settlement provided 
for a real increase in pay – after four rounds of negotiations and large-scale token 
strikes – the encroaching crisis, with its increasing impacts on the real economy, meant 
that this lagged some way behind initial aspirations. The 2010 bargaining round was 
marked by the Great Recession and the issue of job security. It will be dealt with in more 
detail below. 
The debate on the future of sectoral collective bargaining  
Employers and unions in the metalworking industry had widely divergent conceptions of 
the future of the status and functioning of industry-level agreements: during the 1990s 
these differences dominated the entire collective bargaining discussion, and also 
extended to other branches. The main concern of the national employers’ association, 
Gesamtmetall, was both to lower agreed standards and achieve a fundamental 
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reconfiguration of the system of collective bargaining, concretised in its idea of a 
‘pyramid model’ in which only a small number of basic parameters would be subject to 
mandatory regulation at industry level. Alongside this much reduced set of basic agreed 
terms, they argued for an increased number of provisions that would be fleshed out at 
workplace level, and which, as a consequence, would not be fully specified at industry 
level. A third level would consist in agreed, but non-binding, joint recommendations. 
Gesamtmetall summed up its vision for the future of collective bargaining in November 
1997 in its ‘Frankfurt Declaration’, which included the following points: an opening 
clause allowing workplaces to deviate from industry-level provisions to retain jobs; more 
flexible working hours, to be achieved through an agreed working time ‘corridor’ of 30 to 
40 hours; performance-related elements of reward at workplace level; and new 
instruments for resolving conflicts during bargaining. 
IG Metall rejected these proposals, and in 1997 embarked on a debate on how to 
stabilise and develop the system of industry-level agreements at its collective bargaining 
conference. This led to a heated discussion as to the appropriate response to the 
indisputable signs of erosion in the industry agreements in the metalworking industry. 
Some elements within IG Metall argued for the inclusion of formally specified ‘hardship 
clauses’ in collective agreements, which would include the requirements for the 
triggering of such provisions and the procedures to be followed. Others argued that it 
was sufficient to keep to the previous practice, based on more general agreed 
provisions and with a reference to the corresponding regulations set out in the Collective 
Bargaining Act that provides the legal framework for collective agreements. There were 
also different proposals around the issue of the development and structural reform of 
industry-level bargaining. One suggestion was for a system of agreed ‘modules’ or 
‘building blocks’ which would offer companies a range of options in different areas of 
employment regulation and which would be available in addition to existing negotiated 
provisions. A further approach argued for supplementary workplace or company 
agreements that would contain provisions tailored to workplace requirements as a 
complement to the industry-level agreement. 
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Opening clauses in the metalworking industry 
In the metalworking industry deviations from regional sectoral agreements became 
increasingly widespread during the 1990s (Haipeter and Lehndorff 2009: 33ff.). While in 
East German metalworking the existence of formalised hardship clause offered a 
defined procedure to regulate deviations at company level, in West Germany regional 
agreements contained only very general ‘restructuring clauses’ with no procedural 
requirements. As a result, a ‘grey area’ of company deviations emerged and grew, some 
elements of which were backed by sectoral agreements, but in other areas with a 
complete lack of a formal agreed foundation. Because of the lack of transparency and 
central trade union oversight of these company-level developments, there was also a 
lack of empirical data on real extent of such deviations. 
The situation changed with the adoption of the ‘Pforzheim Accord’ in 2004, which led to 
the establishment of common rules and procedures for deviations as well as to a much 
closer control of these process by the central office of the trade union and the 
employers’ association. Since then the use of opening clauses and the conclusion of 
derogation agreements at company-level is relatively well-documented. Both 
Gesamtmetall and IG Metall have published data on developments, with some 
differences that are probably attributable to the large number of instances in which 
opening clauses have been used and the variety of types of deviation from the sectoral 
agreement. 
According to data provided by Gesamtmetall there was a steady rise in company level 
deviations following the Pforzheim Accord (Figure 12). While in September 2004 there 
were only 70 cases reported by Gesamtmetall, the number increased to 730 by April 
2009. 
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Figure 12: Number of company-level deviations from sectoral agreement in M+E, 
September 2004-April 2009 
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According to a study by Haipeter (2009a, 2009b. see also Haipeter and Lehndorff 2009), 
which mainly draw on IG Metall figures, between 2004 and 2007 the bargaining parties 
in the metalworking industry concluded 850 derogation agreements at company level, 
which is equivalent to about 10 % of all companies and about 50% of all employees 
covered by the sectoral agreement in metalworking. More recent figures provided by IG 
Metall show that the number of new derogation agreements was 885 in 2008 and 743 in 
2009 (cf. table 6). In sum there were 3,408 deviation agreements concluded between 
2004 and March 2010. Since the derogation agreements are usually concluded for a 
limited period of time, many will have already expired. In March 2010 IG Metall 
registered 1,060 valid derogation agreements either based on provisions stipulated by 
the Pforzheim Accord or other opening clauses. 
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Table 6: Derogation agreements in German metalworking 2004-2010 
 New Agreements Expired 
2004-2007 850  
2008 885 615 
2009 743 512 
2004-03/2010 3,408  
Valid agreements   
03/2010 1,060  
Source: Haipeter (2009), IG Metall 
The key topics addressed by derogation agreements were pay and working time: 
between 2004 and 2006 about two-thirds of all agreements provided for company-level 
deviations on these two issues (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Issues addressed in derogation agreements in German metalworking 
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In exchange for employee concessions on pay and working time, employers have 
usually had to offer a quid pro quo. By far the most important issue for such ‘counter 
concessions’ is job protection, whereby the employer makes a commitment to refrain 
from compulsory economic terminations during the lifetime of the derogation agreement 
(figure 14). In 2006 4 out of 5 agreements contained a provision on job security. Other 
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important employer concessions have included extensions of workers’ and unions’ co-
determination rights, and commitments to undertake new investment and retain 
operations at existing sites. Between 2004 and 2006, a rising proportion of derogation 
agreements have entailed such employer commitments in return for deviations from 
agreed terms. 
Figure 14: Share of counter-concessions of employers by issue in all derogation 
agreements in M+E, 2004-2006 
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A detailed overview on agreed provisions on flexibility and opening clauses in the 
metalworking and electrical industries is presented in the appendix to this paper. In the 
following section we want to take a closer look at company level bargaining in the 
automotive industry and in particular at the emergence of so-called Pacts on 
Employment and Competitiveness (PECs) in the car industry. 
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6. Concession bargaining: the case of the automotive industry 
IG Metall’s responses to restructuring in the automotive industry are intertwined with the 
process of decentralisation described above. The Pforzheim Accord was partly an 
attempt by IG Metall to regain a certain regulative control over company-level 
developments not only in the car manufacturing. Works councils had experienced 
increasing pressure from employers to make concessions on pay and conditions and 
had already agreed to a large number of company-level agreements which involved a 
wide spectrum of concessions in return for limited job guarantees. The latter 
development first won prominence in the car industry where it was a reaction to major 
restructurings which had shaped the industry since the mid 1980s. 
Restructuring in the automotive industry 
In the mid 1980s car manufacturers had been hit by overcapacities and international 
competition had been considerably heightened under the influence of the success of the 
Japanese car manufacturers. Restructuring, which up to the 1980s had predominantly 
focused on the introduction of new technology in manufacturing was now dominated by 
the adaptation of largely Japanese concepts of production which gained prominence 
under the headings of ‘lean production’ and ‘just in time’ manufacturing (Jürgens 2005; 
Womack et al. 1990). After 1993 the German car plants underwent several waves of 
restructuring (cf. Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2006; Haipeter 2009). Decision making 
within car companies was centralised and management had to fulfil intensified 
expectations from share holders with regard to returns on capital. At the same time the 
internal organisation was decentralised by way of creating business units which had to 
compete as so-called profit centres not only with external suppliers but with other 
business units within the organisation. Every operation came under scrutiny in order to 
find ways of cost cutting. Suppliers felt the increasing pressure from manufacturers to 
lower prices (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2008, 152). Domestic outsourcing of operations, 
an extended flexibilisation of production and a reorganisation of the production chain 
were further elements of this process (Jürgens/Krzywdzinski 2008, 153; Haipeter 2009, 
55).  
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An important factor was the internationalisation of production (Haipeter and Banyuls 
2007). Model components were standardised in order to combine the diversity of models 
with economies of scale and, most importantly, to increase the flexibility between 
different production sites. The production sites and also certain departments were 
domestically and internationally put in competition with each other. As international 
benchmarking became the norm, plants had to bid for future investments. This triggered 
management’s demands for concessions on the part of workers in order to maintain the 
internal competitiveness. 
When faced with these challenges IG Metall and works councils in the car industry felt 
trapped in a dilemma. They shared in principle the employers’ economic objective of 
maintaining and improving international competitiveness but had much more difficulties 
than in previous decades to deal with the consequences.  
‘Pacts for employment and competitiveness’ in car manufacturing 
Confronted with overcapacities and restructuring in the car industry the unions and 
works councils returned to approaches which had helped to manage the structural crisis 
of the steel and ship building industries in the 1970s and 1980s. Seeing no alternatives, 
unions and works councils had accepted the need of employers to adapt to a changing 
economic environment as an inherent necessity of capitalism and a prerequisite to 
maintaining competitiveness (cf. Esser 1982; Candeias and Röttger 2009). What they 
demanded was to be involved in the managing of the crisis and to find solutions which 
avoided forced redundancies. The result was a process of so-called ‘socially acceptable 
job cuts’ (sozialverträglicher Beschäftigungsabbau) which drew on earlier agreements in 
the German coal industry. Its main instruments were extensive early retirement 
schemes, re-training programmes and the placement of workers in so-called job creation 
companies. In the car industry of the 1990s unions and works councils set similar 
priorities. With regard to high unemployment the avoidance of forced redundancies was 
even more a priority and the conditio sine qua non for all agreements which combined 
measures to cut costs with limited job guarantees. Employers on the other hand had to 
weigh the costs of unilateral crisis solutions against the advantages of a more 
consensual approach. 
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In 1995, the IG Metall advocated a so-called ‘Alliance for Jobs’ whereby it offered wage 
restraints in exchange for job guarantees. The national attempts to establish such 
tripartite alliances which were later labelled ‘Alliances for Jobs, Training and 
Competitiveness’ finally failed in 2003. The label, however, was attached to a great 
number of company-level arrangements to manage the ‘necessary modernisation 
process’ in a 'socially acceptable' manner. Following Seifert and Massa-Wirth (2005) we 
summarise any company-level agreement concluded since 1993 which refers to cost 
cutting and job security under the overarching term ‘Pact for Employment and 
Competitiveness’ (PEC) although most of these agreements have different titles. 
Since 1993 PECs have spread to all of the major car companies. Most of them were 
concluded between the company works council and management, some of them, in 
particular since 2004, required the explicit and formal consent of the union. Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski (2006) identify three waves of PECs. A first wave from 1993 to 1996 can 
be regarded in the context of the car crisis – the 1993 Volkswagen agreement described 
above is the best known in this period. A second wave can be observed between 1997 
and 2001 and third one between 2004 and 2006. 
As the reduction of the work force was one objective of employers, various schemes of 
early retirement played a prominent role to handle the various restructuring processes 
after the mid 1990s (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2006, 44-46). In the course of the time, 
however, two problems arose. First the government, which had over a long period 
effectively subsidised these instruments by adjusting the social security system in a way 
that made early retirement especially attractive to both employers and employees (cf. 
Streeck 2009: 56-57), decided to discontinue these subsidies.12 Secondly with returning 
waves of restructuring the number of employees eligible for earlier retirement was 
substantially reduced and companies partially lost out in letting the most experienced 
workers go. 
In general the PECs were a specific form of concession bargaining whereby the 
employees’ side accepted the management’s objective of cost cutting in return for the 
                                            
12 These problems increased when the unification process proved to be much more costly than optimists had hoped for and 
accelerated when governments were confronted with neo-liberal demands for cuts in taxes and social security expenditures in order 
to maintain the overall competitiveness of the German economy.  
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exclusion of forced dismissals and limited job guarantees in the form of promises for 
investments or the fixture of certain employment levels. The PECs differ substantially in 
the degree to which these guarantees and promises can be considered as binding. 
The duration of the agreements and thus the time span for which these limited 
guarantees were given was step by step expanded. Whereas the first agreements ran 
from between two to three years, later agreements - in particular those in the years 
following 2004 had a duration of between five and seven years. 
The concessions 
A very important element in almost all agreements is a substantial increase in working 
time flexibility in a wide range of different forms. Sometimes working times are extended 
and some times they are reduced - in both cases usually with only limited wage 
compensations. In the first wave of agreements during the car crisis of the mid 1990s a 
reduction of working time was predominant whereas in later agreements, in particular 
following 2004, employers insisted on an extension of working times. Provisions for so-
called working time corridors which allow the scheduling of working time according to 
the actual demand of production are prominent in most PECs. Long-term working-time 
accounts allow employees to accumulate hours which can be used either for early 
retirement or for compensation in periods of short-time working. The advantage for 
management lies in increased flexibility and the avoidance of over-time bonuses. 
Concessions on pay are a further element of PECs. They too can take various forms. 
Some pay cuts were achieved by introducing longer working times without pay 
compensation. A frequently found instrument is the provision to reduce on-top payments 
or cuts in extra bonuses where those existed. It was estimated that at the beginning of 
the 1990s the effective income of workers in car manufacturing was between 30% and 
40% above the agreed minimum levels of the sectoral collective agreements in metal 
manufacturing (Jürgens/Krzywdzinski 2006, 6). By 2006 this was down to an on-top 
level of between 15% and 20% (ibid). By 2010 in car companies like Daimler and Opel 
the on-top payments had been almost completely absorbed. A further means to achieve 
a relative lowering of wages was that pay rises which had been agreed in the annual 
bargaining rounds for the metal working industry were only partially applied to the car 
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company concerned. Finally in some cases, such as for example VW, the union agreed 
to the introduction of special lower pay schemes for new entrants - thus effectively 
introducing a two-tier wage system. More often existing staff received some guarantees 
concerning existing income levels which did not apply to new recruits. 
As early as 1997 Volkswagen established its own temporary work agency which allowed 
greater employment flexibility at lower costs due to different pay levels and at the same 
time served as a buffer for employees whose jobs were to be cut. Provisions to regulate 
and partially limit the employment of temporary agency staff appear in a number of 
PECs between 2004 and 2006. 
In line with Rehder (2002) we regard PECs as ‘coalitions for competitiveness’. They can 
be considered as a specific form of ‘productivity coalitions’ (Windolf 1989) which follow a 
tradition of company level corporatism which is favoured by the German system of co-
determination. PECs are compromises against the background of a shifted balance of 
power. Kädtler and Sperling (2001, 291) see the sheer fact that a PEC has to be 
concluded as a signal for a deterioration of the terms of trade for employee 
representatives. They differ from similar agreements made in the USA by the degree to 
which employers engage in job and investment guarantees, albeit limited (Rehder 2003; 
Seifert and Massa-Wirth 2005). The fact that the PECs, despite their structural 
imbalance, are not totally one-sided agreements points to the institutional power of 
works councils and not least to the remaining disruptive potential of car workers. 
7. Crisis management 2008-2010: ‘No dismissals’ 
The financial crisis of autumn 2008 in conjunction with an economic slump in the car 
industry rapidly hit the core of German export industries. Incoming orders, already in 
decline since the second quarter of the year, now dropped sharply and there were no 
signs of any immediate recovery. Faced with a crisis unprecedented in post-war years 
the union was alarmed that this could result in a de-industrialisation process which 
would hit its core constituency and substantially weaken the organisation. IG Metall 
reacted in December 2008 with an action programme, the title of which was: ‘No 
dismissals in 2009’, thus signalling its top-priority (IG Metall 2008; cf. also IG Metall 
2009a). The union pointed to the existing collectively-agreed tool kit for safeguarding 
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employment such as opening clauses or working-time corridors. However, given the 
dimension of the crisis, IG Metall was convinced that the employment problem could not 
be adequately tackled at company level without additional action by the government. An 
immediate measure demanded by the union was therefore the extensive use of short-
time work. It welcomed the fact that the government had extended the legal duration for 
short-time work to a maximum of 18 months and demanded that employers be relieved, 
at least partly, from social security contributions for short-time workers. With a special 
focus on the car industry the union - in line with the business association of the car 
industry VDA, promoted the car scrap bonus mentioned above as an immediate means 
to bridge the slump in demand for new cars. 
As for the wider implications of the crisis the union called for the creation of a public fund 
of 100 billion Euros which should be financed by a compulsory loan on high incomes. 
Furthermore it demanded measures to tackle the credit crunch which negatively affected 
employers’ ability to make investments. The union also called for a repeal of the almost 
total deregulation of temporary agency work which had taken place under the so-called 
‘red-Green’ government in 2002 and demanded that short-time working should be 
extended to temporary agency firms. Finally the union demanded an extension of board-
level co-determination. The establishment, relocation and closure of a production site 
should require a two-third majority in the supervisory board thereby giving employee 
representatives effectively a right to veto plant closures. This demand aimed at a 
generalisation of the far-reaching co-determination rights with already existed at 
Volkswagen. 
‘Crisis corporatism’ 
The union movement had been increasingly sidelined in the final years of the red-Green 
government since 2003. The Grand coalition government of social democrats and 
conservatives which came to power in 2005 continued this policy. It neglected unions 
concerns and extended the pension age from 65 to 67. However, as the crisis escalated 
in late autumn trade unions in general and IG Metall in particular enjoyed a new level of 
esteem which was displayed by employers and government when it saw itself invited 
into a tripartite crisis management. 
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The political constellation favoured a tripartite approach which can be described as 
‘crisis corporatism’ (Urban 2010). The crisis hit the core of the German export economy 
and with the M+E sector the best organised union stronghold in Germany. The Grand 
coalition was facing national elections in autumn 2009 and neither party could have an 
interest in unemployment figures jumping to unprecedented highs. To this was added 
the fact that in autumn 2008 it was less than clear whether the crisis was manageable at 
all or whether it might result in unforeseeable social turmoil. In this situation IG Metall, 
which was still a relevant power in M+E, gained new recognition - not least because it 
might serve as a possible mediator in times of labour unrest. Finally employers and IG 
Metall shared an interest in tackling the credit crunch, lessening the financial burden of 
short-time working for employers and in avoiding mass dismissals. Employers expected 
the economy to recover and had no immediate interest in dismissing their core of skilled 
workers (cf. Möller 2010, Ohl 2011). 
In line with the demands from both parties in the car industry the government eventually 
introduced the car scrap bonus at the beginning of 2009 and eventually prolonged the 
scheme when the first funds expired. This bonus effectively subsidised demand, 
especially for small cars. 
The more important government measure to avoid redundancies, however, was short-
time work. At a political level, employers’ associations and trade unions together 
successfully lobbied the government to extend the possibilities of short-time work which 
allowed companies to reduce labour costs without making workers redundant while at 
the same time the workers received state benefit for the time not worked. IG Metall and 
employers in M+E welcomed the fact that the use of short-time work was first to be 
extended to 18 months and finally in May 2009 made possible for up to 24 months. In 
May 2009 some 912,000 workers, that is almost one in four employees in M+E, was on 
short-time work (figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Short-time workers in M+E industries: monthly development October 
2008 - December2010, in 1,000s 
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Source: Federal Employment Agency, own calculation 
As an additional measure the Federal Employment Agency relieved employers from 
social security contributions for short-time workers. The logic behind short-time work; 
that it considerably cuts working time while minimising costs for employers and limiting 
income losses for employees, became the recurrent theme of the crisis management in 
M+E. 
The 2010 bargaining round, which took place in the second year following the outbreak 
of the financial crisis, bore all the hallmarks of its deep economic impact. And although 
pay settlements had begun to drop back in the previous year, the pressure of the 
continuing crisis meant that they took a further fall in 2010. Many pay settlements in 
2010 saw agreement on non-consolidated lump-sums which, although sufficient to offset 
the generally low level of consumer price increases, meant the employers gained from 
the fact that basic rates were effectively frozen for the future. 
Unprecedented in its bargaining history IG Metall decided to enter into the 2010 
bargaining round without having tabled a specific pay demand and to start negotiations 
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long before the existing agreements were to expire. Instead, its main priority was to 
maintain employment. This was realised through an agreement dubbed ‘A future in 
work’, which would be applied in workplaces where employees had been working on 
short-time, under the statutory short-time scheme, for at least a year. This agreement 
provided for a form of additional agreed short-time working and a subsequent reduction 
in working time, and was set to run until the end of June 2012, after which the provisions 
would definitively expire.13 The essence of the agreement was to create a range of 
instruments that could be used to retain employees in work using a combination of 
statutory and agreed provisions. In a joint initiative with the employers’ association 
Gesamtmetall IG Metall called for additional government subsidies to keep extended 
short-time work attractive for employers. Although the collectively agreed measures to 
extend short-time work did not play a significant role in the aftermath of the agreement 
because the economy recovered more quickly than the bargaining parties had expected, 
the way the agreement was reached highlighted a certain rapprochement of employers. 
The spirit of this ‘crisis corporatism’ also found evident expression in local coalitions 
between works councils, unions, parts of management and local politicians to jointly 
negotiate with the state, in order to get money from the ‘recovery funds’. In many 
companies existing PECs were renegotiated under new terms and conditions. The 
existing limited guarantees to safeguard employment levels had de facto become 
obsolete. Employers demanded new concessions from employees if forced dismissals 
were to be excluded during the crisis. An example is the case of Daimler. In April 2009 
the works council concluded a new PEC although the existing agreement signed in 2004 
excluded forced redundancies until the end of 2011. The new agreement of April 2009 
was meant to save the company 2 billion euros in costs.14 Part of the agreement was a 
limited cut in working time and pay for all employees who were not covered by short-
time work, cuts in collectively agreed on-top pay for short-time workers and a 
postponement of the collectively agreed annual pay increase by five months. In 
exchange for that the company agreed to exclude forced dismissals until June 2010.  
                                            
13 Unless otherwise agreed, collective provisions in Germany continue in force until replaced by a fresh agreed provision. 
14 cf. Marco Dalan, »Daimler spart zwei Milliarden beim Personal « in: DIE WELT, 29 April 2009, Nr. 99, p. 11. 
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In other cases new ‘employment pacts’ were concluded. The most prominent example 
was the car supplier Schaeffler, a large family business which was renowned for its 
distance to IG Metall. In spring 2009 it sought the cooperation with the union in order to 
get government aids to save its business. In exchange for the support of the union the 
company agreed for the first time to introduce board-level co-determination. Finally an 
agreement to safeguard employment was concluded which - like others- excluded 
forced dismissals for a limited period of time in exchange for cost-saving measures. 
The balance of the crisis management 
The limits of the ‘crisis corporatism’ became evident when it came to the wider political 
demands IG Metall had tabled in 2008/2009. None of these demands were picked up by 
the ‘grand coalition’ government of Christian and Social Democrats, nor by the 
conservative-liberal coalition which came to power in late 2009 as a result of the general 
election. A broader political mobilisation of members for these demands did not take 
place either. 
For IG Metall and their members, however, the main focus was on job security and in 
this core field of activity the balance looked quite favourable. Overall employment in 
M+E declined less than anticipated in autumn 2008. Besides the fact that the economy 
recovered comparatively quickly there are two major factors which helped to bring about 
‘Germany’s job miracle’ (Krugman 2009). One was the wide-spread use of flexible 
working time arrangements which were in place in many companies and the second 
were the extensive use of short-time working schemes (Bogedan et al. 2009; Herzog-
Stein and Seifert 2010; Möller 2010). IG Metall points in addition to its promotion of the 
car scrap bonus and draws a positive balance for its crisis management (Allespach et al. 
2010; Ohl 2011). The effects of the car scrap bonus become partly visible if we compare 
the development of short-time working in the engineering industry with that of the 
automotive industry (figure 16). Whereas in the engineering industry short-time work 
remained at a comparatively high level during 2009 and only started to decline in the 
first quarter of 2010, we see the peak of short-time work in the automotive industry in the 
first quarter of 2009 followed by a substantial drop in short-time workers in the second 
quarter of the same year. Due to increasing demands for small cars some 
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manufacturing sites of Volkswagen not only had no short-time work at all but worked 
overtime in the first half of 2009. 
Figure 16: Short-time workers in machine manufacturing (NACE 28) and 
automotive industry (NACE 29): monthly development October 2008 - 
December2010 
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Overall employment in M+E declined by 4.1% between 31 December 2008 and 31 
December 2010 (figure 17). In the same two-year period the engineering industry 
(NACE 28) recorded a decline in employment of 4.8% whereas the core workforce in the 
automotive industry (NACE 29) was diminished by 3.7%. The detailed picture of the 
automotive industry shows that the decline in employment during the crisis was 
proportionally more significant in the supply industries (-4.1%) than in car manufacturing 
(- 3,4%) (cf. table 7 for details). 
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Figure 17: Employment in M+E by end of quarter; 31 March 2008 – 31 December 
2010, in 1,000s 
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Table 7: Employment in automotive industries according to major sub sectors, 
September 2008 – December 2010 
Date 29 Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
29.1 Manufacture of 
motor vehicles 
29.3 Manufacture of 
parts and accessories 
for motor vehicles 
2008-12-31 809,484 405,538 364,033
2009-03-31 793,886 402,117 354,097
2009-06-30 781,008 398,894 346,671
2009-09-30 781,058 398,882 346,984
2009-12-31 773,885 395,595 342,976
2010-03-31 768,139 392,610 340,469
2010-06-30 769,588 392,240 342,648
2010-09-30 778,775 394,893 347,084
2010-12-31 778,641 392,356 349,033
Source: Federal Employment Agency (BA); employees liable to social security contributions 
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Figure 18: Temporary agency workers (total economy): monthly development 
June 2008 - December2010, in 1,000s 
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The trade union itself also came through the crisis comparatively well. Overall union 
membership declined between December 2008 and December 2010 by 2.6%. In the car 
industry, however, the union lost only 0.6% of its working members and in machine 
manufacturing the decline over two years was a modest 1.3%. The fact that union 
membership declined significantly less than the number of jobs might be explained by 
the fact that the union was most widely represented at larger manufacturing sites. We 
can only assume that short-time work and large scale working-time corridors were here 
particularly wide-spread and employers probably more prepared to keep their core 
employees and more reluctant to run into conflicts over dismissals. 
However, the union was well aware that there was a price to pay and that temporary 
agency workers and those with fixed-term contracts quickly lost their jobs. This is 
mirrored in the overall development of temporary agency work during the crisis (figure 
18 above). In the large federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia, IG Metall reported that 
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in January 2010 only 14% of establishments had kept all their temporary agency 
workforce (IG Metall Bezirksleitung NRW 2010: 2). 
Unfortunately there is no data on the sectoral distribution of temporary agency workers 
available. IG Metall estimated that in 2008 about 200,000 agency workers were hired 
out to companies in M+E. In 2007 IG Metall revised its strategy towards agency work (IG 
Metall 2007). It admitted that the efforts by DGB trade unions to negotiate collective 
agreements for temporary agency workers had not been an appropriate strategy to 
solve the problem of wage discrimination. In April 2008 IG Metall had started a 
campaign for equal pay for agency workers with the aim to organise agency workers 
hired out to the metalworking industries into the union and to convince works councils to 
negotiate that whenever agency workers were employed they received the same pay 
and conditions as the regular staff. These efforts have been partly successful. During 
the crisis the union offered support and advice for agency workers who lost their jobs. In 
many cases, however, not only management but effectively also works councils and the 
core workforce complacently accepted that temporary agency workers served as a 
buffer which helped to externalise the crisis (Wassermann/Rudolph 2007; Detje et al. 
2011). It is precisely because of this experience, however, that this form of employment 
became even more attractive to HRM departments when the economy recovered in the 
second half of 2010. In a survey amongst works councils in September 2010 IG Metall 
found that 43% of companies who needed extra staff preferred to hire temporary agency 
workers. The campaign for equal pay and a re-regulation of agency work remained a 
top-priority on IG Metall’s post-crisis agenda (Girndt and Müller 2011). In September 
2010 the union succeeded in negotiating a landmark collective agreement in the steel 
industry which provides equal pay for all agency workers employed in this industry. 
A price for the crisis management, however, was also paid by those who maintained 
their jobs. Not only did they have to bear losses in income but in many cases staffing 
levels were further tightened during the crisis and individual workloads increased. In the 
aftermath of the crisis there are concerns in IG Metall that cost-cutting strategies in M+E 
will be further radicalised and that the costs of the crisis will be shifted to society as a 
whole (Ehlscheid et al. 2010). 
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Conclusion 
The profound changes which underwent collective bargaining in M+E over the last two 
decades have to be regarded against the background of a new global and national 
political and economic environment which emerged after the end of the Cold War. The 
most significant development was the continuous decentralisation of collective 
bargaining. It found its expression in a growing number of opening clauses. In the 
beginning these opening clauses were restricted to a given company experiencing 
serious economic difficulties and the subsequent threat of substantial job losses. Since 
the mid 1990s, however, works councils and employees have been confronted with 
successive waves of restructuring, new production regimes in combination with 
continuous threats to disinvest if no concessions regarding cost cutting were made. The 
deviation from collective agreements was transformed, from being an instrument to be 
applied in extraordinary situations to a more general tool to cut costs in order to improve 
competitiveness. The Pforzheim Accord of 2004 both legalised this practice and 
triggered a new wave of such company-level agreements. 
The bargaining policy of IG Metall is marked by a contradiction between the political and 
economic concepts of the union and its pragmatic subordination under the paradigms of 
competitiveness. On the one hand a Keynesian-oriented approach to macroeconomic 
policy, stressing the demand side of the economy and demanding public investment and 
a more expansive wage policy. On the other hand union representatives have followed a 
bargaining policy at company level which has contradicted precisely this macroeconomic 
policy approach by agreeing to pay restraints in exchange for jobs.  
Parts of the unions have accepted the strategy of ‘organised decentralisation’ via 
opening clauses as a way to prevent a further erosion of sectoral bargaining. Others 
have hoped to regain a certain regulative control over diverging developments at 
company level. The inherent risk of the opening clauses is that instead of containing 
erosion, they may serve to amplify it. The sectoral collective agreement is threatened: 
moving from being a norm which defines the collectively agreed standards within the 
industry to a mere point of reference. Whereas collective agreements up to the 1970s 
defined minimum standards they now tend to mark the maximum in pay and conditions.  
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Despite all these tendencies industrial relations in metalworking have also been marked 
by a comparatively high level of stability. The peak employers’ association has never 
questioned sectoral bargaining as such and has always recognized IG Metall as its 
bargaining partner. Although the overall union movement has been largely on the 
defensive since the mid 1990s and IG Metall has had to face a severe decline in 
membership, the union has retained substantial bargaining power in metal 
manufacturing in general and in the car industry in particular and maintained a 
significant mobilising capacity. Whereas real wages came under pressure nationally, 
collective bargaining in the metal working resulted - in most years - in real wage 
increases. The union has also maintained substantial institutional power. Its long-lasting 
dominance of the institutions of co-determination in M+E has remained unchallenged, so 
far. The integration of the union into the tripartite crisis management during 2008-2010 is 
an expression of its political weight in M+E. Bargaining in M+E during the crisis was a 
mixture of continuity at company level and a temporary interest coalition of employers 
and IG Metall at sectoral level which is likely to give way to more conflictual relationships 
when the imminent economic threats for employment are dealt with.  
With regard to the automobile industry; IG Metall is well aware that major changes are 
imminent. International production chains will further be diversified, new production sites 
in China and other emerging markets will compete with existing plants in Germany. 
Electric vehicles will gain additional market shares and their production will propel 
further changes in the industry (IG Metall 2009b). In the midst of the crisis the union 
commenced an internal restructuring programme, aimed at freeing resources in order to 
reach out to the emerging green industries and to boost activities to organise employees 
who are still not organized. (cf. IG Metall Vorstand 2009; Wetzel 2009). These activities 
are embedded in a wider discussion within the union about the role and future of the 
union in the forthcoming years (cf. Huber 2010; Meine et al. 2011). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Agreed pay increases and duration of collective agreements in the 
metalworking industry  
Year of 
settlement  
Increase 
in % 
In force from  
Lump-sum and other payments, if applicable 
Duration of 
CA (in 
months) 
1990 6.0 % from 1.4.1990 
Two lump-sums of DM 215 to cover April and May  
12 
1991 6.7 % from 1.6.1991 
Two lump-sums of DM 290 to cover April and May  
12 
1992 5.4 % from 1.4.1992 
Increase in annual additional payments of 5%  
21 
 3.0 % Second stage increase in grade rates from 1.4.1993 
Increase in annual additional payments of 5% 
 
1994 2.0 % from 1.6.1994 
After a 5-month ‘pay pause’, cut in annual additional payments 
11 
1995 3.4 % from 1.5.1995 
Lump-sum payments of DM 152.50 for each month from 
January-April 
24 
 3.6 % Increase in grade rates from 1.11.1995  
1997 1.5 % from 1.4.1997 
Lump-sum payment of DM 200 for the period January-March  
Reduction in annual payments 
24 
 2.5 % Second stage increase in grade rates from 1.4.1998  
1999 3.2 %  from 1.3.1999 
Lump-sum payment of DM 350 for January and February plus 
a one-off payment of 1% of annual individual agreed income 
14 
2000 3.0 % from 1.5.2000 
DM 330 lump-sum to cover March and April 2000 
24 
 2.1 % Second stage increase from 1.5.2001  
2002 3.1 % from 1.6.2002  
After a 2-month pay pause and €120 lump-sum payment for 
May, and an additional one-off payment as part of new pay 
framework  
22 
 2.6 % from 1.6.2003  
2004 1.5 % from 1.3.2004 after 2-month pay pause  26 
 2.0 % from 1.3.2005  
additional one-off payment as part of new pay framework 
 
2006 3.0 % from 1.6.2006 
€310 lump-sum to cover March-May  
13 
2007 4.1 % from 1.6.2007 
€400 lump-sum to cover April and May  
19 
 1.7 % Second-stage increase of 1.6.2008 
Lump-sum payment of 0.7% of a month’s pay  
 
2008 2.1 % from 1.2.2009 
€510 lump-sum payment for November 2008 until January 
2009, with an additional one-off payment of €122. 
18 
2010 2.7 % from 1.4.2011 
€320 lump-sum for the period May 2010-March 2011. 
23 
Source: WSI-Tarifarchiv 
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Agreed provisions on flexibility and opening clauses in the metalworking and 
electrical industries (August 2011) 
 
 
Working time (since 1990, with numerous changes) 
? Weekly working hours: West - 35 hours; East – 38 hours. 
? Extendable for 13/18 per cent of the workplace at an establishment (differs by region) up to 40 on 
a permanent basis.  
? In establishments where more than 50 per cent of a workforce are in higher grades, the quota can 
be extended to 45/50 per cent (varies by region). 
? In order to initiate innovation or in the event of skill shortages, the quota may be raised 
irrespective of the current structure of employment. The case must be examined by the 
signatories to the industry agreement on application from the parties at the workplace.  
? The reference period over which agreed hours must be attained where fluctuating working hours 
are agreed ranges from six to 24 months (depending on region).  
? Some regions have agreed provisions on flexible working time accounts and long-term accounts.  
 
Securing employment through time-limited working time reductions (since 1994)  
? Reduction in working time down to 30 hours per week (33 in East Germany), with some regional 
variations, and corresponding cuts in income for all (or some) employees to retain jobs.  
 
General ‘opening clause’ (‘Pforzheim Accord’ (since 2004)  
? Preamble: the aim is retain existing employment and create new jobs in Germany. This requires 
maintaining and improving competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and a positive environment 
for investment. The collective bargaining parties commit themselves to these aims and to the task 
of shaping the context for more employment in Germany.  
? The collective bargaining parties may, after consultation with workplace parties, agree 
supplementary measures or time-limited deviations from agreed minimum standards in order to 
achieve a sustained improvement in the development of employment: this can include reductions 
in additional annual payments, deferment of agreed entitlements, raising or lowering working 
hours, with or without loss of pay).  
 
Pay (regularly since 2006)  
? A variety of provisions on implementation of agreed industry pay rises at workplace/company level 
in a number of agreements (delay, reduction, cancellation, increases). 
 
Agreed short-time provisions (from 2010 to 2012) 
? Prerequisite: Statutory short-time work for at least twelve months 
? New agreement to short-time work with reduced residual overheads for at least six months 
? Reduced working hours with partial remuneration compensation for up to 28/26 hours for at least 
6 months 
 
Source: WSI-Tarifarchiv, as at August 2011 
 Bisher erschienene WSI-Diskussionspapiere 
(ab 2005) 
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